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MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE. By Jon R. Waltz and Fred E. lnbau. 
New York: Macmillan. 1971. Pp. 398. $10.95 
In the decades following World War II it became common prac-
tice in the large medical schools and centers of the United States to 
arrange some sort of course or educational process by which it was 
hoped to acquaint the embryonic physicians with legal concepts, 
ideas, procedures, and institutions. This was often done by a series 
of lectures presented to the senior class under the title of "medical 
jurisprudence" or "professional responsibility" or some other such 
designation. Generally speaking these efforts received the support 
of law school faculties and practicing lawyers; professors and practi-
tioners donated their time to the preparation of syllabi, mitneo-
graphed materials, and the delivery of lectures presumably suitable 
for consumption and digestion by nonlawyers. . 
In recent years, however, there have been indications that this 
kind of program is falling into disfavor. In The University of Michi-
gan School of Medicine, which has undergone far-reaching changes 
in its curricular arrangements, the lectures that were being delivered 
during the student's senior year were first shifted to the junior year 
and then for all practical purposes terminated. Their place has been 
taken by some sort of elective reading course or exercise that is quite 
different from the earlier, more formal arrangments. It is understood 
that similar developments have occurred at other medical-education 
centers. 
The reason or reasons underlying this phenomenon are not 
readily apparent to one not privy to the inner sanctum of medical 
school planning committees. The crowded curriculum; the greater 
emphasis in these latter days upon clinical experience; perhaps a 
revulsion against so-called "didactic teaching" methods; all are said 
to have played a part in the reduction and abandonment of the 
program. Whatever the cause, there are some who regret that physi-
cians are completing their medical education without much under-
standing of the legal system under which they live and with which 
they seem to have an increasing amount of trouble. It was often said 
that if the law discussions did nothing else, at least they dispelled 
some of the irrational fears of law from which physicians suffer and 
disabused them of much medical school superstition, illusion, and 
folklore concerning law. The writer of this review has a distinct 
impression, judging from the calls he receives from interns and resi: 
dents at the Medical Center in Ann Arbor, that a great many young 
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physicians are· coming to their profession profoundly ignorant of the 
nature of the real world, legally speaking. 
Graduates of the Northwestern University Medical School, how-
ever, need not labor under this handicap if they take advantage of 
the good offices of Professors Waltz and Inbau. As manifested at 
the outset of the book here reviewed, the volume is designed for 
practitioners and students of medicine. It is intended to be read and 
studied by medical students and medical doctors, and the authors 
are quite emphatic that while they hope the book will be useful to 
lawyers it should not be regarded as a book intended primarily for 
lawyers. This injunction necessarily precludes certain criticisms that 
might be leveled against the book by a lawyer. On the other hand, 
the creation of a work on law intended to be read and taken seriously 
by nonlawyers casts certain special responsibilities upon the shoulders 
of the authors. More on this point later. 
The book is divided into three parts: "The Physician and the 
Civil Law," "The Physician and the Criminal Law," and "The Physi-
cian in Court." The center of attention, however, is manifested by 
the number of pages devoted to the three areas. The first part in-
volves 323 pages, the second 37 pages, and the third only 8 pages. 
For purposes of this review I consider the three parts in reverse 
order of their appearance. The part on the physician as a witness 
includes an abbreviated description of the role of the witness at a 
trial and ten suggestions for physicians called to that role. Some of 
these suggestions have merit ("Confer with the Lawyer Calling you as 
a Witness"-p. 375); some are of less value ("Do Not Be Nervous or 
Frightened"-p. 373). Teachers who use the book and cover this 
subject ought to ask the student to reread pages 6 to 13 involving 
"The Litigation Process" and pages 34 to 37 covering "The Inter-
professional Code for Physicians and Attorneys." The Code has been 
included in the chapter called "Private Canons of Professional and 
Interprofessional Conduct" (p. 29); it is a very bland statement but 
is mildly suggestive of some of the matters that really cause irritation 
between the professions. It might have been wiser to include a state 
code of interprofessional conduct comparable to Michigan's code1 
which gets closer to the nitty gritty of why physicians shy away from 
being a witness and why attorneys complain about the conduct of 
physicians who are called upon to help in the administration of 
justice. In summary, Part Three serves a function but is clearly a 
minor sideshow in the book. 
Part Two, "The Physician and the Criminal Law," contains three 
chapters. One relates to the medical practitioner and physical evi-
dence in criminal cases, another to the estimation of time of death 
and the interval between occurrence of injury and death, and the 
th_i~d to criminal laws of special importance to the physician. The 
I. 60 J. OF MICH. STATE MED. SoCIET.Y,6;f9 {1961). 
January 1972] Recent Books 643 
first of these chapters has a wealth of valuable suggestioi:is concerning. 
the identification and preservation in criminal cases of tangible evi-
dence such as bullets, blood specimens, swabs, and so on; the handling 
of injured persons, dead bodies, and property in such a way as not to 
add to the difficulties of police investigators; and the proper documen-
tation of external wounds. In the latter connection reference is made 
to the assassination of President Kennedy and the failure to docu-
ment properly the exit bullet wound in the neck prior to the trache-
otomy (p. 330). The discussion of the estimation of the time of 
death and the interval between injury and death occupies less than 
nvo pages. An extensive bibliography is attached. In the last chapter 
of this Part, only three crimes are listed as being of special impor-
tance to the physician: abortion, criminal homicide, and failure to 
report criminally inflicted injuries or habitual use of narcotic drugs. 
It is clear from the foregoing that "forensic medicine" is not a 
subject of major importance in the book nor is the relationship of 
the physician to the criminal law. 
The main focus of the work concerns the physician and the civil 
law with the bulk of the attention and space devoted to the profes-
sional liability of the physician. There is a ten-page chapter on 
"Licensing Laws" (pp. 17-28) but it consists largely of a summary of 
The Illinois Medical Practice Act.2 Starting with Chapter 4, "Lia-
bility for Professional Negligence: Medical Malpractice," we find 
the raison d'etre of the book. 
The presentation of the basic elements of professional liability 
or negligence will be helpful to any interested lay reader. There 
are intelligible discussions of the nature of the various duties owed 
. by the physician to his patient; the "school rule"; the "locality rule" 
and the modern tendency to limit its operation and change the 
standard to a national one; the requirement of expert testimony and 
the problems attendant upon its procurement; the various devices 
utilized by the courts and by some legislatures to overcome the 
difficulties of obtaining expert testimony; vicarious liability; emer-
gency treatment; and the defenses to actions for negligent treatment. 
All bases are touched although one might not be entirely satisfied 
with the approach or depth of treatment in some areas. For ex-
ample, in the subdivision relating to the use of impartial medical 
panels there is a discussion of the "Arizona Plan>f and the "Cali-
fornia Plan" of extrajudicial screening of medical malpractice cases. 
It would also have been worthwhile to mention the New Jersey 
Plan8 which is based upon a court rule rather than local agreements· 
between the professional societies. That system, once invoked, may 
result in an adverse decision binding upon the claimant if he has 
so agreed, and even without agreement such a decision precludes his 
2. !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 (Smith-Hurd 1966). 
3. N.J. CIV. PRAc. R.ULE 4:21. 
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attorney from initiating any further proceedings in the case. It re-
sembles a type of binding arbitration arrangement and the signifi-
cance of this general kind of system is probably growing in the 
country. At any rate physicians ought to know of it. Apart from 
this and a few other minor deficiencies, the discussion of profes-
sional liability for negligence is commendable. 
The question of "abandonment" is carefully analyzed and some 
needed distinctions are drawn, which, if observed, should have the 
effect of eliminating some of the confusion that has characterized 
this area of law. Other chapters that make worthwhile contributions 
to the literature of the field include those treating the problems of 
experimental and innovative therapy, homotransplantation of tissues 
and organs, the public health and child abuse reporting require-
ments, and the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient testi-
monial privilege. All of these chapters will surely be helpful to the 
reader. 
One of the most interesting discussions in the book is found in 
Chapter 11 which takes up that modern conundrum "Informed 
Consent." For more than a decade courts and commentators have 
been struggling with the conceptual and practical aspects of this 
phase of professional liability. The authors of this book, recognizing 
the confusion that has existed, undertake a valiant effort to clear 
the air by suggesting some new paths of analysis. At the outset they 
manifest an understanding of the distinction between the case in 
which plaintiff claims the physician proceeded, without any sem-
blance of consent, to do something that the patient did not know 
he was going to do, and the case based on the theory that although 
the patient consented to the procedure he was not advised fully 
enough of the collateral risks attendant upon it. Regardless of 
whether one feels sympathetic toward this type of analytical rea-
soning, it is a satisfaction to this reviewer to find writers who com-
mence their discussion of the subject cognizant of the classification; 
some courts and ·writers have either ignored it or failed to under-
stand it. As to the first class of cases, there is little to be discussed; 
the courts have consistently held that there is liability on the part 
of a physician who performs a medical procedure without having 
procured the consent of the patient either through express articula-
tion or proper inference from conduct. The authors commendably 
center their attention upon the second class of cases, namely those 
iµ which it is claimed that collateral risks were not sufficiently dis-
closed. 
New lines of distinction are suggested which ought to prove 
fruitful. The first is the difference between furnishing information 
and procuring corfs.ent. As to furnishing in~ormation, risks that could 
be disclosed are separated from psks that should be disclosed. The 
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former category really raises the question to what extent the physi-
cian should have been aware of a risk of which he was in fact 
ignorant and which he therefore could not disclose. The second cate-
gory raises the question, granting that the physician knew of the risk 
and did not disclose it, whether the circumstances were such that 
he ought to have warned of it. There follows a perceptive appraisal 
of the kind of factors that should be taken into account in deter-
mining the obligation of the physician to disclose collateral risks 
of which he is aware. The authors' suggestions are not likely to 
provide a simple touchstone that will satisfy all medical critics of 
the entire theory, but it is the belief of this reviewer that lawyers 
and courts confronting the problem in the future will be pointed 
in the proper direction by the suggestions made in this book. 
One aspect of Chapter 11 merits adverse criticism in this re-
viewer's judgment. It is that portion headed "Extension of the 
Field of Operation" (pp. 174-77). Here it seems that the authors con-
fuse their personal views as to what the rules ought to be with what 
the rules actually are. This is a not uncommon failing among law 
students and law teachers. After a somewhat disconcerting misin-
terpretation of an article ·written by this reviewer in 1968,4 the 
authors purport to summarize the law relating to the extension of 
an operation by a surgeon. In this connection it is clear that they 
espouse the "more enlightened view [that] a surgeon is empowered 
by law to extend the operation to any abnormal condition dis-
covered during the operation if doing so is advisable for the patient's 
welfare and comports with the accepted practice of surgeons gen-
erally" (pp. 175-76). . 
Four cases are used to support this general proposition. There is 
initial reliance on certain dicta in a 1943 opinion of the District of 
Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals.5 The patient's husband was 
sued by the surgeon for his fee. The husband defended on the ground 
that there had been an unauthorized operation on the wife. Plain-
tiff had operated on her for what he diagnosed as a tubular preg-
nancy; he discovered that she had a normal pregnancy but acute 
appendicitis and proceeded to remove the diseased appendix. In 
disallowing the patient's claim that the removal of the appendix 
was unauthorized, the court uses some extremely broad language 
concerning the desirability of the physician doing what he did. 6 
The case is a poor one, of course, in which to raise the consent issue 
because without having suffered any harm the patient was refusing 
to pay what was apparently an otherwise unobjectionable fee. The 
4. Plant, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 639 (1968). See 
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE at 174 and nn.105-07. . 
5. Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 -A.2d 626 (Mun. Ct. ·App. D.C: 1943). 
6. 34 A.2d at 629, quoted on p. 176 of MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
646 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 70 
authors dismiss this feature as a "curious twist,". but in the real 
world an intangible factor such as this one carries considerable 
weight in disposing a court to look with disfavor upon a defense 
that was obviously an afterthought. Furthermore, the holding of the 
case was expressly based on the "emergency" doctrine, as the authors 
indicate (p. 175). To this reviewer it seems unwise to leave the im-
pression that the case is "typical" of the judicial approach. 
The second case used to support the authors' preferred view is 
Kennedy v. Parrott,1 a 1956 North Carolina decision in which the 
surgeon, while performing an authorized appendectomy, found cysts 
on the patient's ovaries and punctured them. The patient later de-
veloped a phlebitis and brought suit. The claim was somewhat 
ambiguous and the causal relation between the puncture and the 
phlebitis was not proved. In appealing from a judgment of involun-
tary nonsuit, plaintiff asserted that the puncturing of the cysts had 
been an unauthorized procedure. In affirming the judgment the 
North Carolina Supreme Court used some very broad language of 
which the authors approve. Similarly in the third case, a 1912 New 
Jersey opinion8 relied on heavily by the North Carolina Court, some 
very broad dicta are found. 
The poorest authority cited, however, is King v. Carney,0 a 1922 
Oklahoma case. This case is referred to by the authors as a "key" 
case and is represented as holding that a patient's request to a physi-
cian that she be "fixed up" so that she could have children could 
be interpreted as a general grant of authority to the surgeon to do 
whatever he deemed advisable, including removal of her Fallopian 
tubes and ovaries when he discovered they were in a diseased condi-
tion. The authors say: 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma interpreted the plaintiff's request 
to be "fixed up" as authority for a diagnostic operation and such 
additional surgery as might be necessary to rectify her condition. 
Since her condition before the removal of the diseased· organs al-
ready made it impossible for her to bear children, and this condition 
could not be reversed, the surgeon was free to act as he did. [P. 177.] 
It is difficult to see how anyone who reads the King opinion carefully 
can cite it for the foregoing proposition. The case came to the 
supreme court on the specific question of the admissibility of the 
surgeon's testimony that "the fallopian tubes and ovaries and sur-. 
rounding tissue were so badly diseased, that it was necessary to re-
move the diseased organs and affected parts in order to preserve 
the plaintiff's life and health, and that it would have b~en dangerous 
7. 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956). 
8. Berman v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L, 20, 83 A. 948 (1912). 
9. 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270 (1922). 
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to her life and health not to do so."10 An objection to that testimony 
was sustained by the trial court and verdict and judgment were for 
plaintiff. The supreme court reversed saying: 
If, in the course of an operation to which the patient consented, 
the physician should discover conditions not anticipated before the 
operation was commenced, and which, if not removed, would en-
danger the life or health of the patient, he would, though no express 
consent was obtained or given, be justified in extending the operation 
to remove and overcome them.11 
The foregoing is a statement of the conventional emergency 
doctrine. The court emphasized that point: 
Evidence tending to show that on account of conditions discovered 
by proper diagnosis the operation was necessary to save the life of 
the patient, tended to show that the operation was authorized under 
the foregoing principle.12 
This reviewer does not know what a "key" case is in the context 
in which the authors use the term. However, even if the case stood 
for the general proposition that they espouse, it was decided in 1922 
and in the almost fifty years that have followed has been cited only 
nine times in judicial opinions.13 Each time, as I read those opinions, 
it has been cited for the emergency exception to the consent require-
ment; I find no instance in which it has been cited for the proposi-
tion the authors claim it exemplifies. 
The foregoing criticism is not intended as mere nit-picking or 
caviling at the legal analysis displayed by the authors or their assis-
tants. It is more serious. In a book intended for use by nonlawyers, 
a writer bears a serious responsibility to distinguish between his own 
views and the courts' holdings; that responsibility is greater than in 
a bobk intended to be read and analyzed by legally trained people. 
Law students, law professors, and practicing lawyers are competent 
to discriminate between what writers say the law ought to be an<l 
what the cases actually hold. Medical students and physicians cannot 
be counted upon to possess this ability. It would be fairly easy to 
imagine a case in which a surgeon who had imbibed the authors' 
suggestions in this subdivision, and who had not procured a broad, 
10. 85 Okla. at 63, 204 P. at 271. 
11. 85 Okla. at 64, 204 P. at 272. 
12. 85 Okla. at 64, 204 P. at 272. 
13. Gray v. Grunnagle, 433 Pa. 144, 152, 223 A.2d 663, 667 (1966); Chambers v. 
Nottebaum, 96 5.2d 716, 719 (Ct. App. Fla. 1957); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 
361, 90 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1956); Higley v. Jeffrey, 44 .Wyo. 37, 43, 8 P .2d 96, 97 (1932); 
13a.xter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 234, 2 P.2d 257, 263 (1931); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 
Iowa 914, 927, 237 N.W. 444, 450 (1931); McGuire v. Rix, ll8 Neb. 434, 440, 225 N.W. 
120, 123 (1929); Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 591, 253 P. 363, 364 (1927); Hershey v. 
Peake, 115 Kan. 563, 565, 223 P. 1113, 1114 (1924). 
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carefully worded consent, could get into serious difficulty by doing 
what he thought was the proper thing but which was clearly outside 
the limits of the emergency doctrine. A recent case in Michigan in 
which an opthamologist got into exactly this sort of trouble is 
Shulman v. Lerner,14 a 1966 decision in which a judgment for 
$12,500. was affirmed. Fortunately such cases are unique; but that 
is because it is the general practice for surgeons to procure a written 
consent expressly authorizing procedures deemed advisable even in 
the absence of emergency. It is not because the principle propounded 
in this subdivision of the book has achieved general acceptance. 
Despite the criticism suggested in the last preceding paragraphs, 
this reviewer wishes to make it clear that he considers the presenta-
tion of these authors in general to be a worthy and commendable 
work. The book is well suited for the use of medical students and 
physicians, at least those who are seriously interested in the subject 
matter. Such an appraisal assumes that it is desirable to acquaint 
members of the medical profession with the elements of the legal 
system. It is, of course, undesirable to leave them with the impres-
sion that they are competent to function as their own legal counsel 
or to make legal decisions without advice from professional sources. 
This book does not leave that impression nor could it properly be 
so read. It should make clear to those members of the beleaguered 
profession who read it that the law is not a mysterious or occult 
area; that the legal system has more merit than would appear from 
recent discussions of the subject in their professional magazines; and 
that many of their fears are without foundation. It is hoped that 
numerous medical students and physicians will read and study this 
book. They will be better informed and probably wiser for having 
done so. 
Marcus L. Plant, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
